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ABSTRACT. The Bankruptcy Code accords much more favorable treatment to lessors than to
secured lenders, but legal scholars have yet to identify a normative justification for the disparate
treatment of the two transaction types. Law-and-economics scholars have written off the
lease/loan distinction as "vacuous"; meanwhile, courts and commentators alike have called on
Congress to abolish the distinction entirely. This Note identifies a normative basis for the
lease/loan distinction -the maximization of aggregate welfare - and explains why leases are
likely to generate less deadweight loss than are secured transactions. In a secured loan, the
secured lender and the borrower may be able to shift depreciation costs to the borrower's other
creditors. By allowing bankruptcy courts to alter the terms of secured loans, the Bankruptcy
Code limits (but does not eliminate) the depreciation cost externalities that may arise from
secured transactions. In a lease, by contrast, the lessor and the lessee internalize depreciation
costs in full. Since leases do not generate depreciation cost externalities, the Bankruptcy Code
does not authorize courts to alter the terms of such transactions.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past few decades, leading law reviews have devoted thousands of
pages to articles arguing that the "full priority" treatment of secured credit is
economically efficient.' Over the same period, perhaps as many pages have
been devoted to articles calling into question the efficiency of secured credit.
In 1983, Professor R.M. Goode characterized the secured credit debate as a
"battle";' in 1997, Professor Elizabeth Warren analogized it to an all-out war.
At the dawn of a new decade, the secured credit conflict rages on.'
1. See, e.g., David Gray Carlson, On the Efficiency of Secured Lending, 8o VA. L. REV. 2179
(1994); Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based Theory of Security
Interests: Taking Debtors' Choices Seriously, 8o VA. L. REV. 2021 (1994); Thomas H. Jackson &
Anthony T. Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143
(1979); Homer Kripke, Law and Economics: Measuring the Economic Efficiency of Commercial
Law in a Vacuum ofFact, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 929 (1985); Saul Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders
in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 49 (1982); Minh Van Ngo, Agency Costs
and the Demand and Supply of Secured Debt and Asset Securitization, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 413
(2002); Robert J. Rosenberg, Beyond Yale Express: Corporate Reorganization and the Secured
Creditor's Rights of Reclamation, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 5o9 (1975); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Easy
Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in Bankruptcy, 47 DUKE L.J. 425 (1997); James H. Scott,
Jr., Bankruptcy, Secured Debt, and Optimal Capital Structure, 32 J. FIN. 1 (1977); Paul M.
Shupack, Solving the Puzzle of Secured Transactions, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 1067 (1989); James
J. White, Efficiency Justificationsfor Personal Property Security, 37 VAND. L. REV. 473 (1984).
2. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured
Claims in Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857 (1996); John Hudson, The Case Against Secured
Lending, 15 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 47 (1995); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's
Bargain, 8o VA. L. REV. 1887 (1994); Alan Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt,
37 VAND. L. REV. 1051 (1984); Alan Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priorities: A
Review of Current Theories, 1o J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1981) [hereinafter Schwartz, Current
Theories]; Robert E. Scott, The Truth About Secured Financing, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1436
(1997); see also William J. Woodward, Jr., The Realist and Secured Credit: Grant Gilmore,
Common-Law Courts, and the Article 9 Reform Process, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1511 (1997)
(questioning the distributive fairness of rules that afford full priority to secured creditors).
3. See R.M. Goode, Is the Law Too Favourable to Secured Creditors?, 8 CAN. BUS. L.J. 53, 57
(1983).
4. See Elizabeth Warren, Making Policy with Imperfect Information: The Article 9 Full Priority
Debates, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1373, 1379 (1997).
5. Recent contributions to the secured credit debate include Brian M. McCall, It's Just Secured
Credit! The Natural Law Case in Defense of Some Forms of Secured Credit, 43 IND. L. REV. 7
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All the while, relatively few scholars have weighed in on whether the full
priority treatment of true leases promotes efficient outcomes.' But although it
has been relegated to the peripheries of legal academia, leasing lies near the
base of the capital structure of many U.S. firms. By one estimate, leases
account for more than one quarter of all new capital equipment acquisitions by
U.S. businesses.! Approximately 70% of Fortune iooo firms-and
approximately 8o% of all U.S. companies'- lease some of their equipment. A
recent study of 4718 public companies in the United States found that the
firms' off-balance-sheet lease commitments were equal to 35% of their reported
liabilities.'o And, according to one account, leasing is the "largest source of
external finance" for small businesses."
Not only does leasing play an important role in the capital structure of
individual firms," but personal property leasing is also a significant sector of
the U.S. economy. In 2007, the most recent year for which data are available,
revenues from the rental and leasing of non-real-estate tangible assets totaled
$120 billion (up from $95 billion in 2002).13 At last count, the non-real-estate
6. But see John D. Ayer, Further Thoughts on Lease and Sale, 1983 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 341; John D.
Ayer, On the Vacuity of the Sale/Lease Distinction, 68 IowA L. REv. 667 (1983) [hereinafter
Ayer, Vacuity]; Amelia H. Boss, Leases and Sales: Ne'er or Where Shall the Twain Meet?, 1983
ARIz. ST. L.J. 357; Margaret Howard, Equipment Lessors and Secured Parties in Bankruptcy: An
Argument for Coherence, 48 WASH. &LEE L. REv. 253 (1991).
7. SCOTT BESLEY & EUGENE F. BRIGHAM, ESSENTIALS OF MANAGERIAL FINANCE 720 (14th ed.
20o8).
8. Id.
9. See Alessandro Gavazza, Asset Liquidity and Financial Contracts: Evidence from Aircraft Leases,
95 J. FIN. ECON. 62, 62 (2010).
1o. Elizabeth MacDonald, Debt Hazards Ahead, FORBES, June 18, 2007, at 8o, 80-81, available at
http://www.forbes.com/forbes/20o 7/o6l8/o8o.html. That figure -from research conducted
by Professor Matthew Magilke of the University of Utah -includes both real property and
personal property leases. Id. Although this Note focuses on the definition of leases in section
1-203 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), which only governs personal property
leases, courts tend to look to section 1-203 even when evaluating leases of real property. See,
e.g., United Airlines, Inc. v. HSBC Bank USA, 416 F. 3d 609, 616 (7th Cir. 2005) (stating
that California's law of real property leases follows the UCC's "functional approach to
separating leases from secured credit with respect to personal property").
n1. Gavazza, supra note 9, at 62.
12. This Note will focus on commercial leases rather than consumer leases. The latter are
governed by a large body of federal and state law in addition to section 1-203 and Article 2A
of the UCC. See, e.g., Consumer Leasing Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 166 7-166 7f (2oo6); UNIF.
CONSUMER LEASES ACT (2001). Thus, to the extent that it discusses bankruptcy
restructurings, this Note will focus on Chapter 11 rather than Chapter 13.
13. These numbers were calculated from figures for NAICS codes 5321, 5322, 5323, and 5324 in
the two most recent Economic Censuses. See Detailed Statistics: Real Estate and Rental and
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rental and leasing sector employed approximately 640,000 people in the
United States.' 4
One explanation for the prevalence of leasing is that "[1]easing . . . ha[s]
lower expected bankruptcy costs to the lessor than borrowing has to the lender,
resulting in lower financing costs for the lessee than the borrower, ceteris
paribus."" Accordingly, a provider of funds (that is, a lessor or lender) will
often argue in bankruptcy court that an asset-related transaction should be
treated as a lease. Meanwhile, a trustee, a debtor, or a debtor's other creditors
will often argue that the same transaction should be classified as a loan. The
Bankruptcy Reporter is replete with cases involving disputes of this type."
While huge stakes hinge on the lease/loan distinction," many legal scholars
are doubtful that the distinction should exist at all. In 1982, Professor Homer
Kripke wrote that "[t]he man from Mars, with a clear eye undistorted by
training in law," would find long-term leases and secured loans to be so similar
"that the differences should fade into insignificance."' 8  One year later,
Professor John Ayer characterized the differentiation between leases and loans
as "an exercise in false concreteness"' and called on the drafters of the
Leasing: Preliminaty Comparative Statistics for the United States: 2oo7 and 2002, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/IBQTable?-bm=y&-geo-id=&-ds-name=
EC0753I2&-_1ang=en (last visited Nov. 1, 2010).
14. Id.
15. V. Sivarama Krishnan & R. Charles Moyer, Bankruptcy Costs and the Financial Leasing
Decision, 23 FIN. MGMT. 31, 31 (1994); see Steven A. Sharpe & Hien H. Nguyen, Capital
Market Imperfections and the Incentive To Lease, 39 J. FIN. ECON. 271 (1995); see also infra Part I
(discussing the disparate treatment of leases and loans under the Bankruptcy Code).
16. See, e.g., In re Uni Imaging Holdings, LLC, 423 B.R. 406 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2010); Pummill
v. McGivern (In re Am. Eagle Coatings, Inc.), 353 B.R. 656 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 20o6);
WorldCom, Inc. v. Gen. Elec. Global Asset Mgmt. Servs. (In re WorldCom, Inc.), 339 B.R.
56 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2oo6); In re Bailey, 326 B.R. 156 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. 2005); In re
Buehne Farms, Inc., 321 B.R. 239 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 2005); In re Fleming Cos., 308 B.R. 693
(Bankr. D. Del. 2004); In re Our Secret, Ltd., 282 B.R. 697 (Bankr. D.N.M. 2002); In re
Metrobility Optical Sys., Inc., 279 B.R. 35 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2002); PSINet, Inc. v. Cisco Sys.
Capital Corp. (In re PSINet, Inc.), 271 B.R. 1 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2001); Smith v. Fendley (In
re Allied Sign Co.), 280 B.R. 694 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 2001).
17. By one estimate, "trillions of dollars" hinge on the lease/loan distinction. See Michael J.
Abatemarco & Anthony Michael Sabino, "True Lease" Versus Disguised Security Interest: Is the
United Trilogy Truly the Last Stand?, 40 UCC L.J. 445, 447 (208). Professors Abatemarco
and Sabino do not explain how they arrived at that estimate.
18. Homer Kripke, Book Review, 37 Bus. LAw. 723, 727 (1982) (reviewing EQUIPMENT
LEASING- LEVERAGED LEASING (B.E. Fritch & A.F. Reisman eds., 2d ed. 1980)).
ig. Ayer, Vacuity, supra note 6, at 681.
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Bankruptcy Code to "abolish this pointless and distracting distinction."20 In
the quarter-century that has elapsed since Ayer's article, his view has elicited
agreement - though little critical consideration - from other legal academics. In
one influential Yale Law Journal article, Professor Lynn LoPucki described
Ayer's argument as "persuasive[]."" Likewise, Professors Lucian Bebchuk and
Jesse Fried cited Ayer approvingly in their seminal 1996 contribution to the
secured credit debate." Meanwhile, most scholars who have written about
related matters have taken the status quo lease/loan distinction as a given but
have declined to defend the distinction as it stands.
This Note attempts to fill that gap. It argues that the lease/loan distinction
is no "exercise in false concreteness." To the contrary, it deters market actors
from using depreciable assets in value-destroying ways and, as a consequence,
increases aggregate welfare." Specifically, the current lease/loan distinction
compels market actors to internalize depreciation costs into their decisions
regarding asset use. In doing so, the lease/loan distinction incentivizes firms to
20. Id. at 668. A few bankruptcy courts have taken note of Professor Ayer's critique. See, e.g.,
Consumer Lease Network, Inc. v. Puckett (In re Puckett), 6o B.R. 223, 233 n.21 (Bankr.
M.D. Tenn. 1986) (describing Ayer's article as a "highly provocative analysis"); see also In re
Steffen, 181 B.R. 981, 987 & n.5 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1995) (citing John D. Ayer, An
Unrepentant View of the Sale-Lease Distinction, 4 J. BANKR. L. & POL. 291 (1995), but
concluding that "[w]hether the policy of treating secured sales differently from leases is
wise, logical, or philosophically elegant, that is the policy Congress enacted").
21. Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death ofLiability, io6 YALE L.J. 1, 64 n.270 (1996).
22. Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 2, at 928 & n.218 ("[T]o the extent that leases are similar to
secured loans, there would appear to be no economic or other reason for treating the
arrangements differently in bankruptcy.").
23. See, e.g., Corinne Cooper, Identifying a Personal Property Lease Under the UCC, 49 OHIO ST.
L.J. 195, 197 (1988) (acknowledging that "[a]s a matter of legal scholarship, the analytical
basis for distinguishing [leases from security interests] may be minimal, to some even
nonexistent," but stating that "[t]his Article does not take sides in this controversy");
Robert W. Ihne, Seeking a Meaning for "Meaningful Residual Value" and the Reality of
"Economic Realities"-An Alternative Roadmap for Distinguishing True Leases from Security
Interests, 62 Bus. LAw. 1439, 1439 n.1 (2007) ("This article makes the ... assumption[]
[that] . . . notwithstanding some scholarly thought, a distinction between leases and secured
transactions is a tenable and useful distinction within commercial law . . . ").
24. This Note considers whether the law of leases and loans satisfies the Kaldor-Hicks
criterion-that is, whether existing rules maximize aggregate welfare. Cf RIcHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW S 1.2, at 12-14 (7th ed. 2007) (arguing, on
philosophical and pragmatic grounds, that Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is the only criterion
upon which economic analysis of the law can rely). This is not to say that policymakers
ought to ignore distributive considerations; rather, this Note adopts the widely held view
that redistributive goals are more effectively achieved through the Tax Code than the court
system. See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient than
the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994).
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invest in asset maintenance when the aggregate benefits of maintenance
activities exceed the costs, and it deters firms from deploying depreciable assets
when the marginal costs of asset use exceed the marginal returns.
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the lease/loan status quo. It
compares the treatment of lessors and secured creditors under the Bankruptcy
Code and explains why - until now - the consensus view among scholars and
practitioners has been that the Bankruptcy Code affords much more favorable
treatment to equipment lessors than to their secured-creditor counterparts.
Part II of this Note analyzes existing arguments against and in support of the
status quo. It shows that neither critics nor supporters of the status quo have
demonstrated why the lease/loan distinction is-or is not-normatively
defensible. Insofar as the lease/loan distinction rests on any normative basis,
that basis has yet to be identified.
Part III presents the heart of this Note's argument. It shows that, under
current law, the distinction between a lease and a loan hinges on whether the
transaction shifts depreciation costs to the lessee/debtor's unsecured creditors.
If the transaction does cause such a shift, then the transaction creates a security
interest, not a true lease. This Note presents a rudimentary formal model to
show that if the parties to a durable goods transaction do not bear the full cost
of depreciation, then depreciation may occur at a faster rate than if the asset
were put to its most economically efficient use. But as long as the lessor's
residual interest in the asset at the end of the lease term is more than nominal,
the lessor has an incentive to monitor the lessee's use of the asset (including the
lessee's investment in maintenance) and to intervene if the lessee's use of the
asset amounts to economic waste. By allowing courts to reallocate depreciation
costs in the case of a secured loan-but not in the case of a lease-the
Bankruptcy Code promotes the efficient use of durable goods.2 s
Ultimately, what distinguishes a lease from a loan is that in a lease, the
provider of funds (the lessor) retains a residual interest in the underlying asset
regardless of whether the asset user (the lessee) remains solvent, whereas in a
loan, the provider of funds (the creditor) has an interest in the underlying asset
only if the user (the debtor) becomes insolvent. While others have drawn
attention to the concept of "meaningful residual interest" in the lease/loan
25. As acknowledged below, the Bankruptcy Code could promote a more efficient use of durable
goods if it subordinated secured creditors' deficiency claims to unsecured creditors' general
claims. See infra text accompanying note 114. See generally Squire, supra note 5 (arguing that
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context," this Note uniquely explains why the law should care about the
allocation of the residual interest. The distinction encourages the allocation of
physical capital to its most productive uses because it forces parties to factor
depreciation costs into their decisions regarding asset utilization and asset
maintenance.
I. LEASES AND LOANS: THE UCC MEETS THE BANKRUPTCY CODE
Although leasing is central to America's economic system, it occupies an
interstitial position in the country's legal system. While lease-related issues are
litigated largely in the bankruptcy context, the Bankruptcy Code itself never
defines the word "lease."" Thus, federal bankruptcy courts faced with disputes
over leases must turn to state commercial law for guidance." In forty-nine
states and the District of Columbia, 9 section 1-203 of the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC) controls the definition of true leases for personal property.3 o But
the UCC's drafters made only passing mention of the bankruptcy implications
when crafting the lease/loan distinction.'
26. See Cooper, supra note 23, at 218 (stating that the sine qua non of a "true lease" is that "there
is a meaningful residual returning to the lessor").
27. See E. Carolyn Hochstadter Dicker & John P. Campo, FF&E and the True Lease Question:
Article 2A and Accompanying Amendments to UCC Section 1-201(37), 7 Am. BANKR. INST. L.
REV. 517, 519 (1999).
28. Powers v. Royce Inc. (In re Powers), 983 F.2d 88, 90 (7 th Cir. 1993) ("'[W]hether . . . a
lease constitutes a security interest under the bankruptcy code will depend on whether it
constitutes a security interest under applicable State or local law."' (quoting S. REP. No. 95-
989, at 26 (1978)); see also United Airlines, Inc. v. HSBC Bank USA, 416 F.3d 609, 615 (7th
Cir. 2005) ("Leases are state-law instruments, after all, and the norm in bankruptcy law is
that . . . leases . . . have the same force they would have in state court, unless the Code
overrides the state entitlement."). But see id. ("A state law that identified a 'lease' in a formal
rather than a functional manner would conflict with the Code.. . .").
29. Louisiana is the only state that has not adopted Article 2A of the UCC. See A Few Facts About
the . . . UCC Article 2A-Leases, NAT'L CONF. COMM'RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS,
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact-factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ucc2a8790.asp (last
visited Nov. 1, 2010).
30. Article 2A governs personal property leases, but the provision distinguishing true leases
from secured loans is found in section 1-203 of the UCC, under the heading of "General
Definitions and Principles of Interpretation."
31. See U.C.C. § 1-203 cmt. 2 (2009) ("'On common law theory, the lessor, since he has not
parted with title, is entitled to full protection against the lessee's creditors and trustee in
bankruptcy . . . .' (quoting 1 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY
5 3.6, at 76 (1965))).
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Although the UCC's official comments do not dwell on the bankruptcy
implications of the leaseAoan distinction, the Bankruptcy Code "accords
radically different consequences" to transactions based on whether they fall on
the "lease" or "loan" side of the divide." More precisely, the Bankruptcy Code
accords considerably more favorable treatment to the lessor than to the secured
lender. While lessors and secured creditors are both subject to the automatic
stay at the outset of the bankruptcy process," the treatment of lessors and
secured creditors diverges as the process moves forward. Under § 365 of the
Bankruptcy Code, the bankruptcy trustee may decide whether to assume or
reject the debtor's leases at any point prior to the confirmation of the
bankruptcy plan. However, the trustee may assume the lease only if she
"cures, or provides adequate assurance that the trustee will promptly cure" the
debtor's default.3 1 Moreover, § 365 does not give the court any authority to
modify the terms of the lease agreement. Thus, if the trustee assumes the lease,
then the lessor acquires a priority claim for the full amount of all lease
obligations (both past and future).
The Bankruptcy Code likewise allows the trustee to abandon the collateral
that secures any of the debtor's loans if the property "is burdensome . .. or ...
of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate." 6 But there the similarity
between the bankruptcy treatment of leases and loans comes to an end. If the
trustee chooses to keep the collateral, the secured lender does not necessarily
receive a priority claim to the outstanding principal and interest. Under § 5o6,
the bankruptcy court must bifurcate the secured creditor's claim into secured
and unsecured components." First, the court assigns a value to the collateral
held by the bankruptcy estate. To the extent that her claim is "secured" by the
value of the collateral, the creditor enjoys priority over other parties that make
claims on the bankruptcy estate. By contrast, the "unsecured" portion of the
32. See Ayer, Vacuity, supra note 6, at 668.
33. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (20o6). During the stay, creditors cannot take action to collect on a
preexisting debt, see id. § 362(a), and a lessor cannot repossess leased goods unless the
trustee has rejected the lease or the time in which the trustee may assume the lease has
passed, see id. § 365(p). In order to obtain relief from the automatic stay, a creditor or lessor
generally must seek approval from the court. See id. § 362(d).
34. Id. § 365(d)(2). For residential real property leases under Chapter 7, the trustee faces a
shorter timeframe (within sixty days unless the court extends the period "for cause"). Id.
5 365(d)(1). A court may also, at its discretion, accelerate the trustee's timeframe for
assuming or rejecting commercial real and personal property leases. Id. § 365 (d)(2).
35. Id. 5 365(b)(i) (A).
36. Id. § 554(a).
37. Id. § 506(a).
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creditor's claim-the amount owed to her over and above the value of the
asset-is paid out at the same rate as all the debtor's other general unsecured
liabilities. Sometimes, this amounts to nothing; more commonly, unsecured
creditors receive partial payment-but far less than secured creditors.
According to one recent study, the mean recovery rate for unsecured claims in
Chapter ii bankruptcies is only fifty-two cents on the dollar (compared to
ninety-two cents on the dollar for secured claims). 3 Moreover, the
"cramdown" provision of the Bankruptcy Code allows the court to restructure
the borrower's payment plan as long as secured creditors receive "deferred cash
payments . . . of at least the value" of their secured claim. 9 Despite the
language in the Bankruptcy Code, bankruptcy courts "may underestimate the
collateral's market value and the appropriate interest rate . . . so that the
payment stream falls short of the collateral's full value."4 o
The interactions between section 1-203 of the UCC and sections 365 and
506 of the Bankruptcy Code frequently generate seemingly strange results. An
example will illustrate this point. Consider the case of a trucking company that
acquires possession of a vehicle that is worth $20,ooo and that has a useful
economic life of ten years. Imagine that the trucking company finances the
purchase with a secured loan that will be paid off over ten years in annual
increments of $2000. If the trucking company files for bankruptcy at any
point before the end of the ten years, then the transaction would be subject to
38. Douglas Baird, Arturo Bris & Ning Zhu, The Dynamics of Large and Small Chapter 11 Cases:
An Empirical Study 37, tbl.i (Yale Int'l Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper No. 05-29, 2007),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=866865.
3g. n1 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) (2006).
40. In re Wright, 492 F.3d 829, 830 (7th Cir. 2007) (Easterbrook, C.J.). As an empirical matter,
it appears that bankruptcy courts are more likely to accept debtors' (lower) estimates of
collateral value than to accept secured creditors' (higher) estimates. See Keith Sharfman,
Judicial Valuation Behavior: Some Evidence from Bankruptcy, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 387, 396
(2005) (examining cases in which secured creditors and debtors submitted divergent
estimates of collateral value, and finding that "bankruptcy judges on average allocated 65.2%
of the value in controversy to debtors"). These findings indicate either that debtors submit
more accurate estimates of collateral value or that judges tend to underestimate the true
value of collateral. One argument in favor of the latter hypothesis is that "[u]ndervaluing
collateral enables the debtor to use the collateral at a lower cost and, therefore, enhances the
chances for successful reorganization. . . . Thus, a bankruptcy court with an inclination
towards a reorganization might habitually err on the side of undervaluing collateral."
Theodore Eisenberg, The Undersecured Creditor in Reorganizations and the Nature of Security,
38 VAND. L. REV. 931, 948 (1985).
41. Of course, a lender would agree to these terms only if the time value of money were zero. See
infra note ng (extending this Note's analysis of the lease/loan distinction to account for a
positive time value of money).
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§ 506 of the Bankruptcy Code (allowing the bankruptcy judge to bifurcate the
lender's claim into secured and unsecured components and to adjust the
trucking company's payment plan). Now imagine that the same trucking
company finances the acquisition of the same vehicle through a nine-year lease,
with annual rent of $2000. Under the terms of the agreement, the trucking
company has the option to purchase the vehicle for its fair market value (that
is, $2000) after nine years; otherwise, possession of the truck will revert to the
lessor. If the trucking company files for bankruptcy at any point before the end
of nine years, a bankruptcy court is likely to hold that the transaction is a true
lease, in which case the transaction will be subject to § 365 of the Bankruptcy
Code rather than § 5o6. If the trustee or debtor-in-possession chooses to
assume the lease, the bankruptcy judge will have no authority to bifurcate the
lessor's claim or adjust the trucking company's rent payments.
Now imagine that, under the terms of the lease described at the end of the
previous paragraph, the trucking company has an option to buy the vehicle
outright for $i at the end of the nine-year period. (Ignore, for the time being,
the question of why a lessor might agree to such a deal.43) If the trucking
42. See, e.g., Sankey v. ABCO Leasing, Inc. (In re Sankey), 307 B.R. 674 (D. Alaska 2004)
(holding that an equipment lease allowing the lessee to acquire the equipment at the end of
the lease term for 1o% of the original purchase price is a true lease); Coode v. M & J Fin.
Corp. (In re Boling), 13 B.R. 39, 44-45 (E.D. Tenn. 1981) (holding that an agreement giving
the lessee the option to acquire trailers at the end of the lease term for 10% of the original
cost is a true lease because "the option price for the purchase of the ... trailers at the end of
the lease term . .. bears a reasonable resemblance to the fair market price of the trailers"); In
re Universal Med. Servs., Inc., Bankr. No. 70-456, 1970 WL 12640 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Dec. 4,
1970) (holding that an agreement giving the lessee "an option to purchase the leased
equipment at the end of the five year term of the lease by paying a sum equal to ten percent
of the original purchase price" is a true lease where "the o% option purchase price . . .
approximates the fair market value of the equipment after five years").
Not all authorities are in agreement on this point. See, e.g., Percival Constr. Co. v.
Miller & Miller Auctioneers, Inc., 532 F.2d 166, 171-72 (loth Cir. 1976) (comparing the
option price at the end of the lease to the cost of the goods at the beginning of the lease and
concluding that an option to purchase for 1o.6 % of the original list price "presents the classic
example of a lease intended as a security interest"). But see Morris v. Dealers Leasing, Inc.
(In re Beckham), 275 B.R. 598, 604 (D. Kan. 2002) (holding that Percival has been
superseded by amendments to the Kansas Statutes that reflect nationwide changes to the
UCC); see also Cooper, supra note 23, at 226-27 & n.1o3 (suggesting that the result reached
by the Percival Court may have been "incorrect" because "without inquiry into the
anticipated value of the goods at the time the option is exercised, this test is irrelevant to the
true nature of the lease").
43. The lessor might be interested in tax benefits because the lessor - as the owner of the asset-
would have the right to deduct depreciation from income for tax purposes. However, the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, too Star. 2o85 (codified as amended in
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company files for Chapter 11 and the trustee or debtor-in-possession petitions
the bankruptcy court to recharacterize the transaction as a loan, the court will
almost certainly grant the petition."4 But, as above, if the trucking company has
an option to buy the vehicle for $2000 at the end of the nine-year term, the
court would likely hold that the transaction is a true lease. 45 In other words, the
debtor's attempt to bifurcate the lessor's claim and extend the payment plan
will succeed when the terms of the agreement are less favorable to the lessor -
but will fail when the terms of the agreement are more favorable to the lessor.
Instead of protecting unsecured creditors from harsh lease terms, the current
law offers aid to unsecured creditors only when the lease terms are already
quite generous to the bankruptcy estate.
Even jurists who are charged with the everyday application of the UCC and
the Bankruptcy Code have failed to see any hidden logic of the lease/loan
distinction. For example, Bankruptcy Judge Dennis O'Brien of the District of
Minnesota has characterized § 365 as "unreasonable" and "misguided."46 He
further stated: "Unfortunately, the effect of . . . [B 365] is to improve post-
petition (by substantial measure) the pre-petition position of a .. . lessor ... at
the expense of other creditors."4 7 Judge O'Brien concluded, however, that
bankruptcy courts are bound by the language of § 365 "[u]nless the Congress
addresses this situation.", 8 Similarly, Bankruptcy Judge J. Craig Whitley of the
Western District of North Carolina has observed that § 365 "seems at odds
with the general premise in bankruptcy that one creditor should not enjoy a
windfall at the expense of other creditors." 9 But Judge Whitley, like Judge
O'Brien, concluded: "that is the intent of [§ 365] as enacted by Congress and as
scattered titles of the U.S.C.), eliminated many of the tax shelters that had made leasing an
especially attractive means of tax avoidance. See Sharpe & Nguyen, supra note 15, at 28o-81.
44. Cf U.C.C. S 1-20 3 (b)( 4 ) (2009) (stating that a transaction qualifies as a security interest-
not a true lease-if "the lessee has an option to become the owner of the goods for no
additional consideration or for nominal additional consideration upon compliance with the
lease agreement"). Indeed, a trustee or debtor-in-possession would probably prevail on this
issue at the summary judgment stage. See, e.g., Bankr. Estate of Wing Foods, Inc. v. CCF
Leasing Co. (In re Wing Foods, Inc.), Bankr. Case No. 09-40154-JDP, 2010 Bankr. LEXIS
114, at *13 (Bankr. D. Idaho Jan. 14, 2010) (holding as a matter of law that an agreement
under which Wing Foods, the ostensible "lessee," had the right to purchase a walk-in freezer
for $1 at the end of the twenty-four month term was a disguised security interest).
45. See supra note 42.
46. In re Monica Scott, Inc., 123 B.R. 990, 993 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991).
47. Id.
48. Id.
4g. In re Wright, 256 B.R. 858, 861 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2001).
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interpreted by previous courts.""o In short, the statutes that set forth the status
quo treatment of leases and loans are in need of an explanation -or in need of
repeal."
II. A CRITICAL REVIEW OF CURRENT THEORIES
Part II of this Note reviews two of the most important contributions to the
lease/loan debate: Professor John Ayer's argument that the lease/loan
distinction is "vacuous" and Judge Frank Easterbrook's defense of the
distinction. Neither scholar has made his case convincingly. Thus, if the
differential treatment of leases and loans under the Bankruptcy Code is to be
justified, that justification must come from an as-yet-unidentified source.
A. Shifting Risks and Drawing Lines
Leases and secured loans are both mechanisms for allocating the risks and
opportunities attendant to asset ownership. Professor Ayer has argued that
although asset users assume more risks in the loan context than in the lease
context, this is not a sufficient justification for distinguishing between leases
and loans." Professor Amelia Boss has argued, in response, that if leases and
loans transfer risks to different degrees, then that difference in risk might be a
reason to distinguish between the two transaction types.53 Ultimately, neither
argument carries the day because neither a lease nor a loan necessarily involves
a greater assumption of risk for the asset user.
When a buyer acquires an asset and grants a security interest to a creditor,
the buyer/borrower still "has upside opportunity and downside risk,"
according to Professor Ayer.54 If the buyer/borrower defaults on the secured
loan and the creditor repossesses the collateral, then the buyer/borrower retains
the right to any surplus if the resale price of the collateral is greater than the
outstanding balance on the loan. Likewise, if the resale price of the collateral is
5o. Id.
si. Since the Bankruptcy Code imports the lease/loan distinction from state law, repeal could
come either through federal bankruptcy reform or through state legislation narrowing the
range of transactions that qualify as leases.
52. Ayer, Vacuity, supra note 6.
53. Boss, supra note 6.
54. Ayer, Vacuity, supra note 6, at 672.
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less than the outstanding balance on the loan, the buyer/borrower is generally
liable for the deficiency."
In a lease agreement, as Professor Ayer points out, the allocation of risks
and opportunities is less clear-cut. In one sense, every lease involves some
transfer of risk and opportunity from the lessor to the lessee. To see why this is
the case, imagine that a trucking company rents a vehicle for $2000 a year and,
the next day, the fair market rental value of the truck rises to $3000 a year.
Presumably, according to Ayer, the lessee "has a gain."S6 Now imagine that
instead of rising to $3000, the rental value of the truck falls the next day to
$1000. "Surely," then, the trucking company has "suffered a loss."5 7 Thus,
when rental payments are fixed in advance, the lessee assumes the risk that the
value of the asset will fall during the lease period but also acquires an
opportunity for gain if the value of the asset rises during the lease period.
Moreover, one can construct an endless number of permutations on the
standard lease agreement, all of which allocate risks and opportunities in
unique ways. What if "[tihe transferee agre[es] to pay the agreed value of the
widget in installments over time" and "may elect to retain the widget after the
end of the term for a dollar," but also "may return the item at any time to the
transferor with no liability"?58 In that case, "the transferee has acquired the
upside opportunity . . . while leaving the downside risk . . . with the
transferor."" Alternately, the lessor and lessee may agree to adjust the rental
price to reflect changes in the value of the asset over the term of the lease. In
such a scenario, the lessee stands neither to gain nor to lose based on
fluctuations in the asset price.
ss. See U.C.C. § 9-608(a)(4) (2009) ("A secured party shall account to and pay a debtor for any
surplus, and the obligor is liable for any deficiency."); id. 5 615(d) ("If the security interest
... secures payment or performance of an obligation," then, except under narrowly defined
circumstances, "the secured party shall account to and pay a debtor for any surplus; and ...
the obligor is liable for any deficiency."). The creditor might still find herself bearing some
portion of the asset-specific risk if the value of the collateral is less than the outstanding
balance on the loan and the borrower's assets are insufficient to cover the deficiency.
56. Ayer, Vacuity, supra note 6, at 68o.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 676-77.
59. Id. at 677.
6o. As Professor Ayer notes, this arrangement is "widely used in shopping centers." Id. at 681.
See generally B. Peter Pashigian & Eric D. Gould, Internalizing Externalities: The Pricing of
Space in Shopping Malls, 41 J.L. & ECON. 115 (1998) (analyzing the use of percentage leases in
U.S. retail malls).
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Less risk/opportunity 4 transferee - More risk/opportunity 4 transferee
Short-term rental Long-term lease Lease + bargain Installment sale
purchase option + security interest
Accordingly, Professor Ayer has argued that all equipment-financing
transactions lie on a risk/opportunity continuum, with some (such as secured
loans and long-term leases) involving large transfers of risk and opportunity
from the provider of funds to the asset user and others (such as short-term
leases with adjustable rental payments) involving much smaller transfers. Since
there is no bright line on the continuum between transactions that involve
large risk/opportunity transfers and transactions that involve small transfers,
Professor Ayer argues that the "dichotomy" between leases and secured loans is
artificial.61 But even if Professor Ayer is correct that the dividing line between
leases and loans is arbitrary, it does not logically follow that the distinction
should be abolished. Indeed, the law often establishes a dichotomy when the
practices at issue actually fall on a continuum with an infinite number of
points. Motor vehicle velocities lie on a continuum between "safe" and
"unsafe"-and, arguably, "any speed limit involves arbitrary compromise
among fuel economy, safety and economics"' 6 -but this arbitrariness "does not
imply that we could do without a speed limit entirely.",6 Indeed, as Professor
Amelia Boss points out, Ayer's argument might easily lead to the conclusion
opposite from the one Ayer himself draws:
The presence of a risk-opportunity continuum may demonstrate that
there are some sales and leases which closely resemble one another, but
61. Ayer, Vacuity, supra note 6, at 684.
62. Charles W. Moore, Editorial, The Problem with Speed Limits Is that They Are Too Low,
GAZETTE (Montreal), Dec. 4, 2007, at A21.
63. R.L. Crouch, A Framework for the Analysis of Optimal Maximum Highway Speed Limits and
Their Optimal Enforcement, 8 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 187, 198 n.t (1976).
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. . . it also demonstrates that some sales and leases (which are at
opposite ends of the continuum) are indeed quite different. Although it
may be hard to draw a distinction between transactions in the middle of
the continuum, a distinction nonetheless may be necessary."
Although Professor Boss does not explain why this distinction is necessary in
the bankruptcy context,6s the next step in the logic seems relatively apparent:
to the extent that a transaction transfers risks to unconsenting6 6 third parties
(that is, the lessee/debtor's unsecured creditors), bankruptcy courts should
have the power to alter the terms of the risk transfer.
To see why equipment-financing transactions may shift risks to
unconsenting third parties, imagine that a trucking company has $1000 in
assets along with $1ooo in debt to unsecured creditors and that the company
chooses to acquire a new vehicle. Assume that the vehicle is worth $20,000 at
the outset and that it is expected to depreciate at a rate of $2000 a year.
Imagine that the trucking company agrees to pay an automotive financing firm
(for example, GMAC 67) $2000 to "lease" the vehicle for the first year and that
the contract obligates the trucking company to pay $18,ooo at the end of year i
in order to acquire the vehicle outright. Under the terms of this transaction, the
trucking company's owners hold the opportunity to gain if the vehicle's value
at the end of year i turns out to be greater than $18,ooo. But what happens if
the vehicle's value turns out to be, say, $17,000 at the end of the year? If the
trucking company files for bankruptcy and if GMAC were still allowed to
collect the full $18,ooo on its secured claim (the $17,000 vehicle plus the
trucking company's $1000 in other assets), then there would be no assets
remaining for the company's other unsecured creditors. In other words, the
unsecured creditors -who were not party to the truck transaction -would bear
the full loss of the decline in the vehicle's value.
64. Boss, supra note 6, at 360.
65. See id. at 362 n.26 ("An extensive analysis of the policies behind the Bankruptcy Act and
their application to the sale-lease distinction is ... beyond the scope of this article.").
66. See infra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
67. The firm formerly known as GMAC was the largest auto lender in the United States until
2008. See Michael Harley, Toyota Tops GMAC as the Biggest U.S. Auto Lender, AUTOBLOG
(Aug. 25, 2008, 6:59 PM), http://www.autoblog.com/2008/08/25/toyota-tops-gmac-as-the
-biggest-u-s-auto-lender/. Following the financial collapse of 2008, the U.S. government
injected more than $17 billion into the firm. The company is now majority-owned by the
federal government, and it has changed its name to Ally Financial Inc. Dan Wilchins, Ally
Financial Eyes 2011 IPO, Negotiation with U.S., REUTERS, Aug. 3, 2010,
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSNo314449820loo8O3.
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This transfer of risk to the trucking company's unsecured creditors would
not raise many concerns if unsecured creditors could adjust the interest rates
on their claims in response to the additional risk. However, "in the real world,"
as Professors Bebchuk and Fried note, "[a] firm will have many . . .
'nonadjusting' creditors.",68 These include tort creditors, public entities with
tax and regulatory claims, and creditors whose claims are simply so small that
they remain "'rationally uninformed"' (that is, the cost of monitoring the
debtor's behavior exceeds any potential benefits).9 Moreover, the class of
nonadjusting creditors will include creditors who lent funds to the trucking
company on fixed terms before the vehicle transaction.7 o Employees" and
consumers with outstanding warranties" may also be nonadjusting creditors.
Section 1-203 of the UCC and § 506 of the Bankruptcy Code, in
combination, make it more difficult for the consenting parties in a commercial
transaction to transfer risk to nonadjusting creditors. A transaction
automatically creates a security interest rather than a true lease if the putative
lessee is, as in the example above, "bound to become the owner of the goods."7 3
Thus, in the example above, a bankruptcy court could rewrite the terms of the
transaction so that if the trucking company filed for bankruptcy and the
debtor-in-possession chose to keep the vehicle, and if the market price of the
vehicle turned out to be less than $18,ooo, the auto dealer would not have a
secured claim for the full $18,000.
There are two normative justifications for limiting the debtor's ability to
transfer asset-related risks to its unsecured creditors. First, the transaction
would trigger distributive justice concerns if it allowed a sophisticated leasing
firm to take priority status over employees, consumers, and tort victims, all of
whose claims are unsecured in part or in whole. Second, granting priority
status to GMAC's claim might lead to inefficient allocations of capital. To see
why, it is useful to break the hypothetical contract above into three
components: the trucking company's first-year rental payment, the trucking
company's call option allowing it to purchase the truck after one year for a
strike price of $18,ooo, and a put option allowing GMAC to sell the vehicle to
68. See Bebchuk & Fried, supra note 2, at 864.
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See Scott, supra note 2, at 1463. But see Schwartz, Current Theories, supra note 2, at 36 (noting
that if employees are represented by unions, they are more likely to adjust their wage
demands based on the firm's risk profile).
72. See F.H. Buckley, The Bankruptcy Priority Puzzle, 72 VA. L. REv. 1393, 1408 (1986).
73. U.C.C. § 1-20 3 (b)(2) (2009).
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the trucking company for $18,000 after one year. If the trucking company and
GMAC both had zero default risk, then-in theory-the positive value of the
call option to the trucking company would exactly offset the negative value of
the put option. But once we introduce the possibility that the trucking
company will file for bankruptcy, then the values are no longer offsetting: the
trucking company acquires an opportunity for gain that is greater than its
corresponding risk of loss. 7 4
As a result, the trucking company would be willing to pay more than $2000
at the start of year 1 for the right to use the vehicle for twelve months plus the
put option/call option combination. Moreover, the contractual surplus shared
by the trucking company and GMAC rises with the trucking company's risk of
bankruptcy because the greater the probability of bankruptcy, the larger the
risk that can be shifted to the trucking company's unsecured creditors. The
danger here is that assets may be acquired by less efficient users with higher
default probabilities, rather than more efficient users with lower default
probabilities.
Interestingly, and logically, section 1-203 of the UCC would allow GMAC
and the truck company to enter into a short-term lease for one year, with rent
of $2000, combined with the opportunity (but not the obligation) for the
trucking company to purchase the vehicle for $18,ooo at the end of the year.
Under section 1-203(c), "[a] transaction in the form of a lease does not create a
security interest merely because . . . the lessee has an option to become the
owner of the goods for a fixed price that is equal to . . . the reasonably
predictable fair market value of the goods."7 ' The UCC recognizes a categorical
difference between, on the one hand, put options that foist risks upon
74. Let 7r equal the probability that the trucking company will file for bankruptcy between t=o
and t=i; let v equal the value of a call option giving the trucking company the right to
acquire an asset for its ex ante expected value x at t=1; and let -v equal the value (to the
trucking company) of a put option obligating the trucking company to acquire the asset for
value, x, at t=i. Assume that variations in the value of the asset at t=1 are normally
distributed around x. Let a represent the probability that the trucking company -if it files
for bankruptcy-will have sufficient available assets such that the lender/lessor can exercise
its put option, o < a < 1. Let b represent the share of the contractual surplus that trucking
company will capture in the bargain, o < b < 1. The value of the call option to the trucking
company's owners is v, which is equal to its cost to the lender/lessor. Because the cost of the
put option to trucking company's owners will be v(1-r), while its value to the lender/lessor
will be v(1-r)+rav, the contractual surplus will be rav. Thus, we can expect that the trucking
company's payment to the lender/lessor at the beginning of year 1 will be equal to the fair
market rental value of the asset for one year plus (1-b)7av.
7s. U.C.C. § 1-203(c).
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unconsenting unsecured creditors and, on the other hand, call options that
foist opportunities upon unconsenting unsecured creditors.
From this analysis, it seems that if leases and security interests lie on a
risk/opportunity continuum, with the short-term rental arrangement on the
left side and the classic installment sale on the right, then it may make sense to
draw a dividing line somewhere on the continuum such that bankruptcy courts
can alter the terms of any transaction that falls to the right of the divide. (This
argument only applies to transactions that shift downside risk to the
lessee/debtor's unsecured creditors, not to transactions that only shift upside
opportunity to the unsecured creditors.) Admittedly, the exact location of the
line inevitably will be arbitrary, but it seems that some effort should be made to
limit the lessee's ability to write put options that her unsecured creditors could
be obligated to honor.n
Thus, Professor Ayer's attack on the lease/loan distinction could just as
easily be read as a justification for that distinction. Professor Ayer is correct
that leases and loans shift downside risks and upside opportunities to
unsecured creditors in different degrees. But even in the absence of a bright
line separating the left side of the spectrum from the right, there may be a
normative justification for limiting the ability of the lessor/lender and the
lessee/debtor to foist downside risks on the lessee/debtor's other creditors. Yet
this justification breaks down at two points. First, the argument against
76. Given the recent financial problems at large-volume lessors (for example, AIG, CIT Group,
and GMAC), we may be worried about transfer of risk to the lessor's unsecured creditors as
well. Importantly, the Bankruptcy Code addresses this worry by allowing the bankrupt
lessor-firm's managers to back out of unwanted, unexpired leases: just as 5 365 allows the
lessee's trustee to reject a personal property lease, it also allows the lessor's trustee to reject a
personal property lease. See Thomas R. Suher, Protecting the Equipment Lessee from the
Potential Consequences of the Lessor's Bankruptcy, 4 U. DAYTON L. REV. 361, 368 (1979) (noting
that although § 365(h) limits the ability of a landlord's trustee to reject a lease, "subsection
(h) clearly applies only to real property leases and, in light of the fact that equipment leasing
was a widely used form of transacting business during consideration of the [1978
Bankruptcy Reform Act] by Congress, the argument that subsection (h) applies equally to
personal property leases is unpersuasive").
77. An advocate for Professor Ayer's position might retort that every transaction on the
continuum should be treated as a security interest. Professor Ayer himself has noted that his
argument might lead to the opposite conclusion: that every transaction on the continuum
should be treated as a lease. See Ayer, Vacuity, supra note 6, at 698 ("We can either include
leases in the category of secured credit, or we can include secured credit in the category of
leases.... I have no intuitions at all on the subject."). Professor Howard has argued that
5 5o6 should cover all leases except for short-term leases, real property leases, and leases for
"unique goods," Howard, supra note 6, at 301-05, but even Howard's "argument for
coherence" draws arbitrary lines between short and long lease terms, real and personal
property, and unique and nonunique goods.
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nonconsensual risk transfers does not apply to nonconsensual opportunity
transfers. Although a transaction does not create a security interest merely
because the lessee (or the lessee's creditors) acquires a call option with a strike
price equal to or greater than the "reasonably predictable fair market value of
the goods," a transaction may create a security interest if it gives the lessee (or
the lessee's creditors) a call option with a strike price substantially less than the
reasonably predictable fair market value. In the example above, the transaction
between the trucking company and GMAC would be a "true lease" if the
trucking company retained the option (not the obligation) to purchase the
truck after year i for $18,000; however, the transaction would be
recharacterized as a loan if the trucking company had the option to purchase
the truck after year 1 for substantially less than $18,ooo. In the latter case, the
call option could be characterized as "an option to become the owner of the
goods for . . . nominal additional consideration,""' thus converting the lease
into a security interest. If section 1-203 of the UCC and § 5o6 of the
Bankruptcy Code are designed to protect unsecured creditors from
nonconsensual risk transfers, then it seems strange to reclassify a lease as a
security interest because it gives the unsecured creditors too good of a deal.
Second, it is not at all obvious that the lessee assumes less risk in a short-
term rental arrangement than in a long-term lease or a secured loan. If, in the
example above, the trucking company enters into a ten-year lease agreement
with GMAC in 2011 at $2000 a year, and the fair market rent for comparable
trucks rises to $3000 in 2012, then the transaction constitutes a gain for the
trucking company. (Even if the trucking company only needs the vehicle for
one year, it can assign the lease to another party for $3000 in 2012 and book a
$1ooo-a-year profit.) If the fair market rent falls to $1ooo in 2012, then surely
the trucking company has suffered a loss." But by the same token, if the
trucking company instead opts for a one-year lease agreement even though it
needs the vehicle for the next decade, and if the fair-market rent for
comparable trucks rises to $3000 in 2012, then surely the trucking company has
suffered a loss (at least relative to the position that it would have been in if it
had agreed to the ten-year arrangement). Likewise, if the trucking company
opts for a one-year lease and the fair market rent falls to $1ooo in 2012, then
presumably the trucking company has a gain (at least relative to the position
that it would have been in under the decade-long deal). In sum, in a secured
loan, the borrower assumes the risk that the price of the asset will fall but also
acquires the opportunity for gain if the price of the asset rises. In a short-term
78. U.C.C. § 1-203(b)(4) 6
79. See Ayer, Vacuity, supra note 6, at 680.
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lease, the lessee assumes the risk that the price of the asset will rise but also
acquires the opportunity for gain if the price of the asset falls. In this sense,
short-term leases and secured loans distribute risks symmetrically: in a short-
term lease, the lessee goes "short"; in a secured loan, the borrower goes "long."
Risk/opportunity analysis alone cannot explain why the Bankruptcy Code
treats the transactions differently.
B. "'Old' Firm/'New' Firm": The Easterbrook Argument
Perhaps the only academic who has offered a full-throttled defense of the
lease/loan distinction is Frank Easterbrook, who did so in his judicial-rather
than his professorial- capacity.8o In a 2005 case arising out of United Airlines'
$23 billion bankruptcy," Judge Easterbrook turned to the Bankruptcy Code,
the UCC, and California common law12 to "flesh[] out the definition""3 of a
true lease.
Whereas Professor Ayer's analysis takes the UCC as its "beginning
point, " Judge Easterbrook's analysis begins by considering the basic
objectives of the Bankruptcy Code; from there, Easterbrook attempts to deduce
why the Bankruptcy Code's drafters might have chosen to distinguish leases
from secured loans." Judge Easterbrook's argument in United Airlines springs
from his analysis of the Bankruptcy Code in Boston & Maine Corp. v. Chicago
Pacific Corp., 6 one of his first opinions after joining the Seventh Circuit. In
Boston & Maine Corp., Judge Easterbrook explained his view of the Chapter 11
process:
8o. United Airlines, Inc. v. HSBC Bank USA, 416 F. 3 d 609 (7 th Cir. 2005).
81. In its Chapter 11 filing in 2002, United listed $22.7 billion in assets, making it the largest
bankruptcy filing by a U.S. airline up to that point. Edward Wong, Bankruptcy Case Is Filed
by United, N.Y. TiMEs, Dec. 10, 2002, at Ai.
82. Since the transaction at issue was a real property lease at the San Francisco International
Airport, California common law rather than the UCC was controlling. However, Judge
Easterbrook concluded that the California common law approach to the lease/loan
distinction is "similar" to section 1-203 of the UCC and focused his analysis on the latter.
United Airlines, 416 F.3d at 616.
83. Id. at 612.
84. Ayer, Vacuity, supra note 6, at 669.
85. United Airlines, 416 F. 3 d at 612-14.
86. 785 F.2d 562 (7 th Cit. 1986). Boston & Maine Corp. was argued on October 29, 1985. Id. at
562. Judge Easterbrook was confirmed by the Senate in April 1985. See History ofthe Federal
Judiciary: Easterbrook, Frank Hoover, FED. JUD. CENTER, http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/
nGetlnfo?jid= 678 (last visited Nov. 1, 2010).
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Bankruptcy draws a line between the existing claims to a firm's assets
and newly-arising claims. . . . If there are not enough assets to go
around, some [existing] claims may be written down or extinguished.
The ongoing operations of the business are treated entirely differently;
new claims are paid in full as they arise. It is as if the bankruptcy
process creates two separate firms-the pre-bankruptcy firm that pays
off old claims against pre-bankruptcy assets, and the post-bankruptcy
firm that acts as a brand new venture.1
According to Judge Easterbrook, rental payments under a true lease are
expenses of the brand new venture and are paid in full, whereas debt service on
a secured loan is an existing claim subject to writedown. In the United case, the
airline had "leased" twenty acres at San Francisco International Airport from a
California state agency, but after the term of the lease United would retain
access to the twenty acres without making any additional payment to the
agency." Judge Easterbrook observed that " [t] he 'rent' is measured not by the
market value of 20 acres within the maintenance base but by the amount
United borrowed" from the state agency."9 Thus, United's obligations should
be treated as debt service owed by the "old" United rather than postbankruptcy
expenses of the "brand new venture." That, in itself, does not seem like a
controversial conclusion. As Judge Easterbrook noted, "Reversion without
additional payment is the UCC's per se rule for identifying secured credit.""o
The Seventh Circuit panel's decision was a straightforward application of
black-letter lease law. The more pertinent question-at least for the purposes
of this Note-is not whether Judge Easterbrook's conclusion in the case was
correct but whether his old firm/new firm analysis was the right way of getting
there.
There might be a strong normative argument for the old firm/new firm
distinction. If United had been liquidated, the California state agency could
87. Bos. & Me. Corp., 785 F.2d at 565; see also United Airlines, 416 F. 3d at 613 (citing Bos. & Me.
Corp., 785 F.2d 562).
88. United Airlines, 416 F. 3 d at 617.
8. Id. The state agency had issued bonds to finance the construction of the United maintenance
base and had then lent the proceeds from the bond sale to United. The advantage of this
setup was that the bondholders paid no taxes on the interest associated with the bonds
because debt service payments made by state entities are generally tax-exempt. See id. at
610-11.
go. Id. at 617; cf U.C.C. § 1-20 3 (b) (2009) ("A transaction in the form of a lease creates a
security interest if . .. the lessee has an option to renew the lease for the remaining economic
life of the goods ... or . .. to become the owner of the goods for no additional consideration
or for nominal additional consideration upon compliance with the lease agreement.").
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have re-leased the twenty acres to another tenant. If the leased asset had been
personal property, the lessor also could have sued for "accrued and unpaid rent
... as of the date the lessor repossesses the goods" plus expectation damages
plus incidental damages, "less expenses saved in consequence of the lessee's
default."" The lessor's claim would have been paid pro rata along with the
claims of all of United's other unsecured creditors." Anything above the
amount that the lessor would have received in liquidation is "going-concern
surplus."93 As Judge Easterbrook has argued elsewhere, returns beyond the
sum that a claimant would have recovered in liquidation should "go[] into the
pot with other unsecured claims."94
Although a strong normative case might be made for limiting the lessor's
claim to the fair market value of future rents, the drafters of the Bankruptcy
Code clearly intended something else. Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code does
not draw a line between existing claims under lease agreements and "newly-
arising" ones. According to the text of the statute, "If there has been a default
in an . . . unexpired lease of the debtor, the trustee may not assume . . . [the]
lease unless . .. the trustee . .. cures, or provides adequate assurance that the
trustee will promptly cure, such default."' In other words, the supposedly
"brand-new venture"-if it wants to assume its predecessor's leases-is still
burdened by any unpaid lease obligations of the "pre-bankruptcy firm."
Indeed, the Supreme Court has rejected the old firm/new firm analogy for
the purposes of § 365. In NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco,96 the Court explicitly
91. U.C.C. § 2A-528(1) (2009).
92. The formula would be different for real property because real property leases are not
covered by UCC Article 2A, and § 502 of the Bankruptcy Code caps lessors' claims for
damages under unexpired leases of real property at "the rent reserved by such lease, without
acceleration, for the greater of one year, or 15 percent, not to exceed three years, of the
remaining term of such lease." 11 U.S.C. § 5 02(b)(6)(A) (20o6).
93. Cf Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, The End of Bankruptcy, 55 STAN. L. REV. 751,
754 (2002) (defining "going-concern surplus" as "the value a firm has above and beyond the
liquidation value of its discrete assets").
94. In re Hoskins, 102 F.3 d 311, 320 (7th Cir. 1996) (Easterbrook, J., concurring). Although
Hoskins was a Chapter 13 case, Judge Easterbrook argued in his concurrence that
" [v]aluation rules ... should be identical across chapters." Id.
95. 11 U.S.C. § 3 6 5(b)(1).
96. 465 U.S. 513 (1984). Although the Bildisco Court addressed "executory contracts," the
Court's analysis applies with equal force to unexpired leases, as executory contracts and
leases are governed by the same provision of the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 365. An
executory contract is "a contract under which the obligation of both the bankrupt and the
other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either to complete
performance would constitute a material breach excusing the performance of the other."
Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460
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stated that the "new" postbankruptcy firm does not have the right to alter the
terms of executory contracts into which the "old" prebankruptcy firm has
entered. The debtor-in-possession has the right to exit the contract entirely,
but "[s]hould the debtor-in-possession elect to assume the executory
contract ... ,it assumes the contract cum onere [that is, subject to a burden].""
According to the Court, "it is sensible to view the debtor-in-possession as the
same 'entity' which existed before the filing of the bankruptcy petition," albeit
"empowered by virtue of the Bankruptcy Code" with a limited authority to
reject (but not to alter) executory contracts.9" The "onus" is that the debtor
must make all overdue payments under the contract and fulfill all additional
obligations as they come due."9
To see just how far Judge Easterbrook's old firm/new firm analysis strays
from the status quo, imagine that GMAC and the trucking company sign a
lease allowing the trucking company to use the vehicle for its entire economic
life, with annual payments pegged to an index of the fair market rent for
similar trucks. Under this arrangement, the trucking company would never pay
more than the cost of its inputs, but the transaction would still be a security
interest under the UCC because "the original term of the lease is equal to . . .
the remaining economic life of the goods."oo If the trucking company filed for
bankruptcy, the debtor-in-possession would not necessarily have to make
payments in full as they arise; instead, a court could substitute its own
valuation of the collateral, adjust the payment schedule, and impose a
cramdown interest rate on GMAC. Contrary to Judge Easterbrook's old
firm/new firm theory, the fact that the trucking company's rent payments
(1973). The executory contract at issue in Bildisco was a collective bargaining agreement. See
Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 516.
g. Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 531; see also In re Italian Cook Oil Corp., 190 F.2d 994, 996-97 (3d Cir.
1951) ("[T]he trustee is given the right to adopt or reject an executory contract. He must do
one or the other. . . . The trustee, however, may not blow hot and cold. If he accepts the
contract he accepts it cum onere. If he receives the benefits he must adopt the burdens. He
cannot accept one and reject the other."). The Bildisco Court explicitly adopted the holding
of In re Italian Cook Oil Corp. See Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 531-32.
g8. Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 528.
gg. The agreement disputed in Bildisco was an executory contract within the scope of 5 365, and
the circuit courts have applied Bildisco to leases. See, e.g., Adelphia Bus. Solutions, Inc. v.
Abnos, 482 F.3d 602, 6o6 (2d Cir. 2007) (applying Bildisco to a dispute regarding the
debtor's rejection of a commercial lease); Eagle Ins. Co. v. Bankvest Capital Corp. (In re
Bankvest Capital Corp.), 360 F. 3 d 291, 295-96 (ist Cir. 2004) (applying Bildisco to a dispute
regarding the debtor-in-possession's attempt to assume unexpired equipment leases).
100. U.C.C. § 1-2o3(b)(1) (2009).
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covered the cost of inputs - and no more -would not be enough to shield the
putative lease from recharacterization as a loan.
Now imagine that instead of a lease for the entire economic life of the
vehicle at fair market value, the trucking company and GMAC agreed to a five-
year lease under which the trucking company would pay $1000 for the first
four years and $6ooo at the beginning of year five. This fifth-year payment is,
in part, an "old claim" against the prebankruptcy firm. Assuming (as above)
that the fair market rent for the vehicle is $2000 a year, then the additional
$4000 in year 5 compensates GMAC for the fact that the trucking company has
been paying less than the fair market rate for the first four years. Even so,
under the black letter of the Bankruptcy Code, a court would have no power to
adjust the terms of this fifth-year obligation. The trucking company would
have to pay the full $6ooo or would have to reject the lease and surrender the
vehicle. There may be a strong argument for treating the first transaction
(which locks the debtor into the fair market rate) as a lease while treating the
second transaction (which imposes an above-fair-market rent on the debtor) as
a loan. But the Bankruptcy Code would decide each case the opposite way.
In sum, this Part has considered two frameworks for analyzing the
lease/loan distinction: Professor Ayer's risk/opportunity approach and Judge
Easterbrook's old firm/new firm theory. Professor Ayer begins from the
premise that leases and security interests lie on a risk/opportunity continuum
and proceeds to the conclusion that any dichotomous distinction between
leases and security interests is therefore arbitrary and untenable. I have argued
(a) that even if Professor Ayer's premise is true, his conclusion does not follow,
and (b) that neither a short-term rental arrangement nor an installment sale
necessarily imposes more (or less) risk on the lessee/buyer. Meanwhile, Judge
Easterbrook begins from the premise that the Bankruptcy Code distinguishes
between old expenses, which are dischargeable in bankruptcy, and new
expenses, which are paid as they come due. However, the Bankruptcy Code
does not, in fact, distinguish past-due lease payments from present and future
ones; the trustee must make all payments in full in order to assume the lease.
Thus, if the Bankruptcy Code's lease/loan distinction has any merit, it must
arise from some as-yet-unarticulated rationale.
III.THE "DEPRECIATION EXTERNALITIES" APPROACH
In Part III, this Note presents a new analytical approach to the lease/loan
distinction that focuses on the allocation of depreciation costs under different
contractual frameworks. Section III.A shows that if secured claims were not
subject to bifurcation and cramdown, a firm's present owners could externalize
depreciation costs to the firm's unsecured creditors -provided that those
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creditors are nonadjusting. If the firm's present owners fail to internalize
depreciation costs, then they may use their assets in value-destroying ways.
Alternately, or additionally, they may fail to invest in maintenance even when
the increase in the present value of the asset as a result of additional
maintenance expenditures is greater than the cost. Section III.B shows how the
Bankruptcy Code's rules regarding bifurcation address the problem of
depreciation externalities in the context of secured loans. Section III.C argues
that the UCC separates transactions into two categories -"lease" and "secured
loan" -based on whether the transaction creates an opportunity for the
consenting parties to externalize deprecation costs. If a transaction falls on the
"secured loan" side of the divide, then the Bankruptcy Code's bifurcation
provisions become necessary in order to mitigate depreciation externalities.
However, for true leases, the lessor already bears the cost of depreciation, so
bifurcation becomes unnecessary.
A. Deadweight Loss from Depreciation in a World Without Bifurcation
When a lessor/lender and lessee/debtor shift downside risks to the
lessee/debtor's unsecured creditors, the result is not only a redistribution of
wealth but also a reduction in aggregate welfare. To see why, imagine that a
widget-maker acquires a widget-making machine to churn out its product.
How many widgets will it produce? Begin from the uncontroversial
assumption that in a competitive market the profit-maximizing firm will
continue to make widgets until the marginal cost of an additional widget
exceeds the market price."o' One of the costs incurred by the firm is
depreciation, "the reduction in the valuation of fixed equipment" over time."o2
Economist Joe Bain has drawn a much-followed distinction among three types
of depreciation costs: "(1) obsolescence, (2) deterioration by the elements, and
(3) the rate of use.""o3 In other words, the value of the widget-making machine
may decline (1) because other market actors have invented more
technologically advanced widget makers; (2) because of factors (for example,
rust) that will affect the machine regardless of whether it is regularly used; and
(3) because of the wear and tear of widget-making.
The first and second factors are fixed costs and, as such, will not necessarily
affect the firm's decision to make or refrain from making more widgets (at least
101. See, e.g., N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF EcoNoMIcs 296-97 (2d ed. 2001).
102. Joe S. Bain, Depression Pricing and the Depreciation Function, 51 Qj. ECON. 705, 709 (1937).
1o3. Id.
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in the short and medium terms).o' This Note focuses on the third factor-
"use-depreciation""o- and its effect on marginal cost. If a firm has a nonzero
probability of bankruptcy, and if bankruptcy means that the firm's creditors -
rather than its present owners-will come into possession of the firm's assets,
then the firm's present owners do not internalize the marginal costs of use-
depreciation.
Imagine what would happen if § 506 did not allow for bifurcation (that is,
if secured loans were treated like leases). If the widget-maker filed for
bankruptcy, the trustee or debtor-in-possession would have two options: keep
the machine or abandon the collateral. If the trustee or debtor-in-possession
abandoned the collateral, the bankruptcy estate would still be liable for any
difference between the outstanding principal and the resale price of the widget-
making machine. If the restructured firm kept the machine, it would have to
make all principal and interest payments under the loan agreement as they
came due. In our imaginary world without bifurcation, the bankruptcy court
could not adjust the payment schedule or impose a cramdown interest rate on
the lender.
As a general rule, a firm will use an asset up to the point that the marginal
revenue generated by asset use is equal to the marginal cost. However, in a
hypothetical world without bifurcation, the widget-making firm would not
bear all the costs of asset use. First, some of the costs of use-depreciation would
be borne by the secured creditor that financed the acquisition of the machine. If
the widget-maker filed for bankruptcy and the trustee or debtor-in-possession
abandoned the collateral, then the secured creditor could resell the machine in
an attempt to recoup the outstanding principal on the loan. To the extent that
the value of the machine had depreciated faster than the principal on the loan
had been paid down, the secured creditor would have a deficiency claim against
the bankruptcy estate. But because deficiency claims are unsecured claims,
which are rarely paid in full, the secured creditor would recover only a portion
of the difference between the outstanding principal and the value of the
collateral.
Second, and more disconcertingly, at least some (and potentially all) of the
costs of use-depreciation would be borne by the debtor's unsecured creditors. If
the trustee or debtor-in-possession abandoned the collateral, the secured
creditor's deficiency claim would dilute the other unsecured claims against the
bankruptcy estate. If the debtor-in-possession assumed the loan, the costs to the
unsecured creditors could be even greater. In our hypothetical world without
104. See MANKIw, supra note loi, at 277-78.
1o5. See, e.g., A.D. Scott, Notes on User Cost, 63 ECoN. J. 368, 381 n.1 (1953).
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bifurcation, the bankruptcy court could not alter the terms of the loan; thus,
the debtor-in-possession would be obligated to pay off all of the remaining
principal. Since the secured creditor would be made whole, all the costs of use-
depreciation would be borne by the other unsecured claimants.
To see how this hypothetical legal regime would generate deadweight loss,
consider Figure 2 (below). The line labeled Social Cost represents the
aggregate costs to all market actors-the widget-maker, the secured creditor,
and unsecured creditors -as a result of asset use. The line labeled Private Cost
representso 6 the costs that the widget-maker and the secured creditor bear in
the widget-making process.o"
106. Let z be the probability of bankruptcy and D' be the marginal cost of use-depreciation. Let
C' be the marginal cost of the additional widget, including all depreciation costs, such that
C'-D' is equal to the marginal cost of the additional widget less the cost of use-depreciation.
Let a equal the probability, conditional on bankruptcy, that the trustee or debtor-in-
possession will choose to keep the collateral. Let p represent the rate at which unsecured
claims are paid out, O < p < 1.
If the trustee or the debtor-in-possession abandons the collateral, then the secured
creditor recoups pD' and bears losses of (i-p)D'. In other words, the secured creditor bears
the cost of depreciation to the extent that unsecured claims are paid out at less than face
value. (This is because the secured creditor's deficiency claim is an unsecured claim.) If the
trustee or the debtor-in-possession keeps the collateral and makes all payments in full, then
the secured creditor bears no depreciation-related costs.
Thus, the costs to the secured creditor in bankruptcy are (1-a)(1-p)D' or
(1-p-a+ap)D'. The secured creditor bears these costs with probability 7r. The costs of asset
use to the secured creditor are thus 7r(i-p-a+ap)D'. Meanwhile, the costs of asset use to the





107. For simplicity's sake, I am assuming that the secured creditor is undersecured- that is, the
outstanding balance on the loan is greater than the value of the collateral. If the opposite is
the case, use-depreciation will not impose a cost on the secured creditor; to the extent that
the value of the collateral exceeds the borrower's debt, the remainder will go to the
borrower, not the creditor.
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Figure 2.




q Quantity of Widgets q,
Assuming that the firm's present owners and its secured creditor can
bargain over the terms of the widget-making machine's use, the firm's output
will be equal to q2. Importantly, this is true regardless of the allocation of use
rights in the initial loan agreement: if the loan agreement contains a term that
caps the number of widgets that the lessee can churn out at some q < q2, then
the firm will pay the creditor to loosen the loan restriction because the benefit
of additional widget-making to the firm's present owners exceeds the cost to
the secured creditor. Likewise, if the loan agreement contains no use restriction
and the firm's present owners produce q > q2, then the secured creditor will pay
the firm's present owners to reduce their use of the machine because the cost of
additional widget-making to the secured creditor exceeds the benefit to the
firm's owners.
Even though the full costs of use depreciation are borne by neither the
firm's present owners nor its secured creditor, these costs do not disappear
from the social welfare calculus. To the contrary, these costs are borne by the
firm's unsecured creditors and thus are still included in the marginal social cost
of the additional widget. Let q, equal the quantity of widgets that would be
produced if output were set at the socially optimal level. For all q > q,, the social
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cost of the additional widget (that is, the cost to the firm's present owners plus
the cost to the secured creditor plus the cost to the unsecured creditors) more
than offsets the benefits. The shaded triangle in Figure 2 represents the
deadweight loss to society that would arise from overuse of the widget-making
machine under this hypothetical legal regime.
B. The 5 5o6 Solution to Deadweight Losses from Depreciation
How does bifurcation reduce deadweight loss? If the trustee or debtor-in-
possession chooses to keep the collateral, then-assuming that the secured
creditor is undersecured and that the bankruptcy court correctly values the
collateral -the secured creditor's claim is reduced to reflect the depreciation of
the asset. Thus, the secured creditor loses the ability to recoup the full amount
of the outstanding principal. With more to lose from depreciation, the secured
creditor will presumably devote more efforts toward monitoring the widget-
maker's asset use. Moreover, the secured creditor will bargain for restrictions
on asset use that bring the widget-maker's output closer to the socially optimal
level.
Admittedly, this story overstates the efficiency of the § 506 scheme in two
respects. First, it is unrealistic to assume that transaction costs between the
firm's present owners and the secured creditor will be zero. The firm's present
owners and the secured creditor incur positive transaction costs at the
bargaining stage, monitoring stage, and enforcement stage. However, it is
realistic to assume that transaction costs will be lower for secured creditors who
negotiate use restrictions and monitor debtor behavior than for unsecured
creditors who seek to do the same. If the widget-making machine is a small
portion of the firm's total assets, then no single unsecured creditor may have
an incentive to monitor the firm's use of the machine,"' and coordination
among unsecured creditors may be prohibitively expensive.109 Secured credit
addresses this coordination problem through a division of monitoring labor
among the firm's various creditors.o Moreover, secured credit transactions
lo8. See, e.g., Levmore, supra note 1, at 53-54.
log. Id. at 54 ("Creditors might solve their freeriding problem by undertaking a joint venture that
would employ a predetermined, efficient monitor to investigate the debtor's activities....
That such associations are not popular for monitoring debtors' future activities may be a
function of the substantial costs entailed in their establishment and the additional cost of
monitoring the monitor.").
11o. See, e.g., Jackson & Kronman, supra note 1, at 1154 n.45 ("Two creditors with the same
general monitoring abilities may be able to achieve a reduction in their total monitoring
costs ... through a simple division of labor.").
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may allocate monitoring tasks to creditors with asset- or industry-specific
expertise, further reducing the sum of monitoring costs."' While it is an
exaggeration to say that 5 5o6 eliminates deadweight losses from overuse, it
may reduce such losses by forcing secured creditors to internalize use-
depreciation costs.
Second, and perhaps more damningly, § 5o6 still allows a firm's present
owners and the secured creditor to externalize some portion of use-
depreciation costs to unsecured creditors. Depreciation to the collateral does
not reduce the secured creditor's claim dollar-for-dollar. The secured creditor
still has an unsecured deficiency claim against the bankruptcy estate, which will
be paid pro rata with all other unsecured claims."' Figure 3 represents this
point graphically. The combined cost of use depreciation that the secured
creditor and the widget-making firm bear under the § So6 regime is higher
than the cost to those parties under a hypothetical world without bifurcation.
But it is still lower than the social cost of asset use. This is because in the event
of bankruptcy, the secured creditor does not bear depreciation costs in full;
rather, the secured creditor bears only the portion of depreciation costs not
recouped through the partial payout of the creditor's deficiency claim."'
Assuming again that the secured creditor can negotiate, monitor, and
enforce use restrictions without incurring transaction costs, widget output will
shift to q3, where q, < q < q, (see Figure 3). The shaded triangle in Figure 3
represents the deadweight loss from overuse of the widget-making machine
under the § 5o6 regime-less than in a world without bifurcation, but still
greater than in a world in which the secured creditor's deficiency claim were
eliminated or subordinated to other unsecured claims." 4
ill. See, e.g., Ngo, supra note 1, at 427.
112. See ii U.S.C. §§ 506(a), 7 26(a)-(b) (20o6); see generally Squire, supra note 5, at 866
(arguing that secured transactions "would be more socially beneficial if the secured
creditor's deficiency claim to the unsecured assets were subordinated to the claims of
unsecured creditors").
113. Assuming that the "secured" creditor is undersecured, the marginal cost of the additional
widget to the secured creditor under § 5o6 is simply (1-,u)rD'. The secured creditor fares no
better when the debtor-in-possession keeps the collateral than when the debtor-in-
possession abandons the widget-making machine. Consequently, the marginal cost of the
additional widget to the firm's present owner and the secured creditor under 5 5o6 is
C'-rD'+(1-pu)rD', or, more simply, C'-prD'. If the secured creditor is oversecured, then the
marginal cost of the additional widget to the secured creditor is zero and unsecured creditors
bear depreciation costs of 7D'.
114. As to whether the efficiency-maximizing outcome would best be achieved by eliminating the
secured creditor's deficiency claim or subordinating it to all other unsecured claims, see
Squire, supra note 5, at 861-62.
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Figure 3.




To translate this argument into dollars and cents, consider the trucking
company example from Part I. (A truck is, in essence, a widget-making
machine, except that its output is denominated in distance moved rather than
goods produced.) Imagine that a trucking company finances the acquisition of
a vehicle through a secured loan from GMAC. Imagine, moreover, that there is
a 50% probability of the trucking company going bankrupt, that there is a 50%
probability that the trustee or debtor-in-possession will seek to keep the
collateral in bankruptcy, and that unsecured claims are paid out at a rate of fifty
cents on the dollar. (Assume, for the sake of argument, that secured claims are
all repaid in full.)
As a general rule, for every additional mile that a commercial truck is
driven, the truck loses approximately eight cents in value."s Thus, the trucking
company will bear four cents in depreciation costs for every additional mile
w15. See Gary Barnes & Peter Langworthy, The Per-Mile Costs of Operating Automobiles and Trucks
22 tbl.4.2 (Minn. Dep't of Transp., Final Report No. 2003-19, 2003), available at
http:.//www.caf. wvu.edui/resm/faculty/borisova/TrucklrCost.pdf.
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that the truck is driven."6 In a world without bifurcation, the expected cost of
depreciation to GMAC would be one cent per mile;117 thus, the trucking
company would continue to use the vehicle even if the marginal cost of an
additional mile (including depreciation) were three cents less than marginal
revenue (because the trucking company and GMAC would externalize three
cents per mile in depreciation costs to unsecured creditors).
Section 506 addresses-but does not fully solve-this problem. Now, the
trucking company bears four cents per mile in depreciation costs, and the
secured creditor bears per-mile depreciation costs of two cents."' As the
secured creditor is still paid pari passu along with other unsecured creditors, to
the extent that the value of the vehicle is less than the balance on the loan, not
all of the depreciation costs are borne by the trucking company and the secured
creditor: two cents per mile of depreciation costs are still borne by the
unsecured creditors. Assuming that the unsecured creditors cannot negotiate
with the trucking company (and that the secured creditor can negotiate with
the trucking company), the company will continue to drive the truck even
when the marginal profits before depreciation are in the range of six to eight
cents. Yet as noted above, the use of the truck is value-destroying from a
societal perspective unless marginal profits before depreciation exceed eight
cents. Section So6, as it stands, forces secured creditors and asset users to
internalize some of the depreciation externalities that would arise in a world
without bifurcation. But even bifurcation is not a complete solution to the
problem of depreciation externalities.
C. How the UCC and the Bankruptcy Code Limit Depreciation-Related
Deadweight Losses in Leasing
The cross-cutting statutory scheme for leases -section 1-203 of the UCC
and § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code-achieves the same objective as the
bifurcation of secured claims: making it more difficult for a firm's present
owners and their equipment-financing counterparties to externalize use-
depreciation costs to unsecured creditors. Indeed, the treatment of leases under
the Bankruptcy Code may deter depreciation externalities more effectively than
§ 5o6, because the latter section still allows the firm and the secured creditor to
externalize some depreciation costs to unsecured creditors. By contrast, in a
lease agreement, as long as the asset reverts to the lessor at the end of the lease,
116. (1- r)D'= 0.50 x .o8 = 0.04.
117. o(a)(1-p)D' 0.5 x 0.5 x 0.5 x o.o8 = 0.01.
n8. (1-pu)D'= 0.5 x 0.5 x 0.08 = 0.02.
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then use-depreciation over the life of the lease has reduced the value of the
lessor's residual interest. As long as the value of the asset at the end of the lease
is greater than zero, then every additional dollar of use-depreciation costs leads
to a dollar-for-dollar reduction in the lessor's residual interest." Thus the
marginal cost of the additional widget to the lessor and the lessee is equal to
the social cost. As long as the lessor can negotiate use restrictions with the
lessee and monitor the lessee's behavior, the output of widgets will not
exceed q,.
To return to the trucking company example from Section III.B, imagine
that instead of borrowing the funds to buy the vehicle, the company leases the
vehicle for a term of years that is less than the useful economic life of the truck.
Now, the trucking company (lessee) bears zero cents in depreciation costs for
every additional mile that the truck is driven, but the lessor (in this case,
GMAC) bears all eight cents in per-mile depreciation costs. As long as GMAC
and the trucking company can negotiate over the terms of the asset use, the
parties can allocate these depreciation costs however they like. For example,
GMAC might charge the trucking company an additional eight cents for every
additional mile driven. Alternately, GMAC might offer the trucking company
an eight-cent-per-mile rebate if total distance falls short of a certain threshold.
From an aggregate welfare perspective, the manner in which GMAC and the
trucking company choose to allocate depreciation costs is not terribly
important: what matters is that GMAC and the trucking company internalize
the full costs of depreciation and thus have an incentive to manage those costs
accordingly.
Importantly, this is true even if the lessee retains an option to purchase the
asset at the end of the lease term. As long as the contractual purchase option is
119. The perfect dollar-for-dollar match between depreciation costs and the corresponding
reduction in the lessor's residual interest is -admittedly- an artifact of this Note's
assumption that the time value of money is zero. In reality, the reduction in the present
value of the lessor's residual interest is equal to D'/(l+r)', where r represents the risk-free
real interest rate and t represents the time (in years) until the lease expires. Economists often
use the yield on Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) as a measure of the risk-free
real interest rate. See, e.g., Marcus Miller, Paul Weller & Lei Zhang, Moral Hazard and the US
Stock Market: The Idea of a 'Greenspan Put' 2 (Ctr. for Econ. Policy Research, Discussion
Paper No. 3041, 2001), available at http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP3041.asp. As of the
writing of this Note, the most recent auction of five-year TIPS generated a 0.55% yield.
Recent Note, Bond, and TIPS Auction Results, TRFASURYDIRECT,
http://www.treasurydirect.gov/RI/OFNtebnd (last visited Nov. 1, 2010). At a o.55% risk-
free real interest rate, the lessor would internalize 97 cents of every dollar of depreciation
costs for a lease five years from expiration -and 95 cents of every dollar of depreciation costs
for a lease ten years from expiration. In sum, this Note's assumption of zero time value of
money has little substantive effect on the models' core results.
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an option rather than a requirement, the lessee is free to renegotiate the terms
of the acquisition at the end of the lease. Assuming that the market for widget-
making machines (or commercial trucks) is perfectly competitive, the lessor
will not be able to force the lessee to pay more than the fair market value of the
machine.
Of course, a "lessor" and "lessee" could structure an equipment-financing
transaction and call it a "lease" even if the lessee's unsecured creditors bore
some portion of marginal depreciation costs. However, such a transaction
would not be a "lease" under section 1-203(b) of the UCC. Indeed, each of the
four factual scenarios in section 1-20 3(b) weeds out financing transactions that
shift depreciation costs away from the lessor; a transaction that meets one of
these four criteria is, ipso facto, not a lease.
First, "[a] transaction in the form of a lease creates a security interest if ...
the original term of the lease is equal to or greater than the remaining economic
life of the goods."1 2o Since the "lessor" has no expectation that she will receive
an asset with any value at the end of the lease term, she has no incentive to
negotiate use restrictions or monitor the lessee's behavior. The marginal costs
of depreciation will be split between the present owners of the lessee firm
(which will bear those costs if the firm stays solvent) and the lessee firm's
unsecured creditors (who will bear those costs if the firm enters bankruptcy).
Thus, the private costs of asset use to the consenting parties (the lessee and the
lessor) are less than the social costs, so the firm's total output will be above the
socially optimal level (giving rise to deadweight loss). The crosscutting
statutory scheme of the UCC and the Bankruptcy Code addresses this risk by
reclassifying these "entire economic life" leases as loans, thus subjecting them
to bifurcation by the bankruptcy court.
Second, a transaction creates a security interest under the UCC if "the
lessee is bound to renew the lease for the remaining economic life of the goods
or is bound to become the owner of the goods."1 2' Under this scenario, the
"lessor" has monopoly power over the lessee at the end of the lease term
because the latter is contractually obligated to rent or acquire the asset from the
former. Thus the lessee does not have access to a perfectly competitive market
and cannot necessarily obtain fair market value for the asset. Therefore, there is
not necessarily a one-to-one correlation between use-depreciation costs during
the lease term and the lessor's residual interest after the lease term. The firm
may be forced to acquire the asset for more than its fair market value, and, if
the firm is bankrupt, these costs will be borne by its unsecured creditors.
120. U.C.C. § 1-20 3 (b) (2009).
121. Id.
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Sensibly, the UCC avoids this outcome by reclassifying the transaction as a
security interest.
The third and fourth elements of UCC section 1-20 3(b) address the same
general set of facts: a "lease" agreement contains a term that allows the "lessee"
to keep the asset "for no additional consideration or for nominal additional
consideration" at the end of the term. 2 Upon first glance, these provisions
may seem to conflict with other elements of the UCC and the Bankruptcy Code
that attempt to protect unsecured creditors. From the unsecured creditor's
perspective, the bargain purchase option is much more desirable than a
purchase option at fair market value. However, if the crosscutting statutory
scheme is viewed as an efficiency-maximizing mechanism, then these
provisions make perfect sense. If the lease agreement gives a bargain purchase
option to the lessee firm, then the lessor has no expectation of realizing her
residual interest in the asset. Thus she has no incentive to negotiate, monitor,
and enforce restrictions on the firm's use of the asset. Again, assuming that
unsecured creditors cannot organize to protect their interests before
bankruptcy, the marginal cost of the additional widget to the firm's present
owners is the only binding cost constraint, and output above the socially
optimal level generates a deadweight loss.'
The depreciation externalities framework also sheds light on the logic
behind section 1-203(c), which sets forth scenarios in which a transaction does
122. Id. Section 1-20 3(b)( 3) covers agreements in which the option allows the "lessee" to "renew
the lease for the remaining economic life of the goods" at no or "nominal" cost. Section 1-
203(b)(4 ) covers agreements in which the option allows the "lessee" to "become the owner
of the goods" for no or "nominal" cost.
123. Instead of phrasing this argument in terms of overuse, one can make the same argument in
terms of underinvestment in maintenance. Let M' equal the marginal cost of maintenance on
the widget-making machine and let A' equal the marginal increase in the value of the
machine as a result of maintenance. Assume, for the sake of simplicity, that all of the
benefits of maintenance are reaped at the end of the economic life of the machine (that is,
the machine's efficiency is unrelated to the maintenance investment, but the machine's
economic life increases over the amount invested in maintenance). Investment in
maintenance generates a social surplus as long as A' > M'. However, if 7r represents the
probability that the firm that owns the widget-making machine will go bankrupt before the
end of the economic life of the machine, then the firm's owners will only invest in
maintenance to the point that (1-7r)A' > M'.
In a true lease, A' accrues to the lessor, so the lessor has an incentive to ensure that the
optimal amount of maintenance investment occurs. In a secured loan under § 5o6, (1-xr)A'
accrues to the borrower; (1-p)7rA' accrues to the secured creditor; and pA' accrues to the
borrower's unsecured creditors. Assuming that secured creditors can influence the amount
invested in maintenance but that unsecured creditors cannot, maintenance investment only
occurs up to the point that (i-pr)A'> M'.
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not create a security interest. Two of these 1-203(c) scenarios deserve additional
discussion.
First, a transaction does not create a security interest "merely" because the
present value of the lessee's obligations exceeds the fair market value of the
leased goods.'" This provision is interesting because it conflicts with the
treatment of leases under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP),
which require a lease to be recorded as a liability if "[t]he present value ... of
the minimum lease payments . . . equals or exceeds 90 percent . . . of the fair
value of the leased property ... to the lessor." 1 2 Why does the UCC ignore this
factor?
The depreciation externalities framework offers an answer. Consider again
the case of the trucking company and GMAC from Part II. As long as GMAC
expects that at the end of the lease it will receive a truck worth more than $1,
then every dollar of depreciation reduces GMAC's expected utility by $1 as
well. This is true regardless of whether the trucking company is paying $2000
per year in rent, or $2 million, or one cent. It remains true up to the point that
GMAC's residual interest in the truck at the end of the lease term falls to zero.
As long as the truck is worth something to GMAC, then every extra bit of
depreciation cuts into GMAC's expected return. If the hypothesis of this Note
is correct-that true lease status under the UCC hinges on whether
depreciation costs lie with the lessor -then it makes sense that the UCC would
disclaim reliance on the total sum of lease payments.
Second, section 1-203(c) provides that a transaction does not create a
security interest "merely because . . . the lessee agrees to pay . . . maintenance
costs."112 6 If one of the efficiency advantages of leases is that the lessor dictates
124. U.C.C. § 1-203(C).
125. ACCOUNTING FOR LEASES, Statement of Fin. Accounting Standards No. 13, 5 7(a)-(d) (Fin.
Accounting Standards Bd. 1976). Under Financial Accounting Standard 13 (FAS 13), a
transaction also must be recorded as a liability rather than a lease if (a) "[t]he lease transfers
ownership of the property to the lessee by the end of the lease term"; (b) "[t]he lease
contains a bargain purchase option"; or (c) "[t]he lease term ... is equal to 75 percent or
more of the estimated economic life of the leased property." Id. § 7(a)-(c). These three
criteria have analogues in UCC § 1-203: (a) a transaction is not a true lease if the lessee
becomes the owner of the asset at the end of the term; (b) a transaction is not a true lease if
the lessor has the option to become the owner for nominal consideration; and (c) although
section 1-203 only reclassifies a lease as a security interest if the lease term is equal to loo%
or more of the estimated economic life of the asset -whereas FAS 13 draws the line at 75%-
both the UCC and FAS 13 look at the same general attribute (the ratio of the term of the
lease to the economic life of the asset). By contrast, the UCC explicitly states that lease status
does not depend on the ratio of the present value of lease obligations to the fair value of the
asset. U.C.C. § 1-203.
126. U.C.C. § 1-203(c).
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maintenance investment, then this provision might seem to be anomalous.
However, this provision may be justifiable based upon Coase's theorem: if the
lessor and the lessee internalize all the benefits of maintenance investment, and
if transaction costs between the lessor and the lessee are sufficiently low, then
the parties will shift maintenance costs to the lessee only if the lessee is the
cheapest-cost maintainer. In the case of a passenger car lease, the dealer
(lessor) might be the cheapest-cost maintainer because the dealer has greater
automotive expertise than the consumer. In the case of a commercial aircraft
lease, the airline (lessee) might be the cheapest-cost maintainer because it
employs teams of mechanics at each of its destinations. There is no reason for
the law to impose maintenance costs on one of the parties as long as the parties
themselves internalize the benefits of maintenance.
CONCLUSION
This Note has hypothesized that a firm's lessors are more likely than its
unsecured creditors to prevent it from putting depreciable assets to inefficient
uses. When depreciation reduces the lessor's residual interest dollar-for-dollar,
the lessor has a strong incentive to negotiate use restrictions in the lease
agreement, to monitor the firm's use of the depreciable asset, and to enforce
the use restrictions if the firm fails to comply with the terms. By contrast, when
the costs of depreciation are spread among a large number of unsecured
creditors, each creditor may have an incentive to free-ride off the bargaining,
monitoring, and enforcement efforts of others. Moreover, some unsecured
creditors (for instance, tort claimants) may have no ability to negotiate asset-
use restrictions with the firm. Relative to unsecured creditors, secured creditors
have more of an incentive to negotiate use restrictions, to monitor firm
behavior, and to enforce those terms in the event of noncompliance. Relative to
lessors, secured creditors have less of an incentive to incur negotiation,
monitoring, and enforcement expenses because secured creditors do not bear
depreciation costs dollar-for-dollar. When loans are undersecured (that is, the
value of the collateral is less than the balance on the loan), an additional dollar
of depreciation reduces the value of the creditor's secured claim by one dollar
but also increases the value of the creditor's unsecured deficiency claim by one
dollar. Unsecured deficiency claims are rarely paid in full but are often paid in
part. Even when the borrower is insolvent, the secured creditor's net loss from
each dollar of depreciation is likely to be only around fifty cents (although that
figure will vary dramatically from case to case).127 Thus, the secured creditor
u27. See supra text accompanying note 38.
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only bears a portion of the depreciation costs if the borrower becomes insolvent
(even if the loan is undersecured). Ironically, although courts and
commentators have called for leases to be treated more like secured loans,2 the
law of leases actually incentivizes parties to preserve the value of durable goods,
whereas the law of secured loans may motivate market actors to use durable
goods in value-destroying ways.
In sum, this Note has sought to identify a coherent rationale for UCC
section 1-203's distinction between leases and loans that takes into account the
Bankruptcy Code's disparate treatment of the two transaction types. Perhaps
most importantly, it seeks to draw attention to a disconnect between legal
theory and economic reality: despite the prevalence of leasing in the U.S.
economy, the community of law-and-economics scholars has so far given
leasing short shrift. If the lease/loan distinction is as vacuous as Professors
Kripke and Ayer, among others, maintain, then perhaps any effort to justify the
status quo will be in vain. But as this Note has argued, the lease/loan
distinction - far from being vacuous - may be a valuable tool for forcing market
actors to internalize depreciation costs in their decisions regarding everyday
asset use and maintenance.
128. See, e.g., In re Wright, 256 B.R. 858, 861 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 2001); In re Monica Scott, Inc.,
123 B.R. 990, 993 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991); Howard, supra note 6, at 271 l.90.
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